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I.

INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 2003, the Iraqi Governing Council adopted the Statute of the

Iraqi Special Tribunal (“IST Statute”) creating the legal foundation for the Iraqi Special
Tribunal (“IST”) with provisions on its organization, jurisdiction and basic procedures.
Under the IST Statute, the IST is independent of any Iraqi government bodies and has
jurisdiction over any Iraqi national or resident accused of committing between July 17,
1968, and May 1, 2003, war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, in addition to
certain specified Iraqi crimes. 1 The newly created IST follows the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
(“SCSL”). This memorandum will examine the key lessons the IST can learn from these
three currently active ad hoc tribunals which will assist the IST in carrying out its
mandate.2

1

Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, art. 1(b), Dec. 10, 2003, available at http://www.cpairaq.org/human_rights/Statute.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2004) [hereinafter IST Statute]. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 4].

2

Where previous students working with the Cox Center War Crimes Research Office have researched and
written extensively on issues addressed in this memorandum, I have adopted their analysis and have
provided a copy of their memorandums in the accompanying notebooks.

1

II.

IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL JURISDICTION
The IST has jurisdiction over only Iraqi nationals or residents of Iraq who are

accused of the following crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
manipulation of the judiciary or involvement of the functions of the judiciary, wastage of
national resources, squandering of public assets and funds, and the abuse of position and
the pursuit of policies that may lead to the threat of war or the use of the armed forces of
Iraq against an Arab country in accordance with Iraqi law. 3 The IST shall have
jurisdiction over these crimes committed in Iraq or elsewhere, between July 17, 1968, and
May 1, 2003.4
The IST and the national courts of Iraq have concurrent jurisdiction with respect
to the following crimes: manipulation of the judiciary or the involvement of the functions
of the judiciary; wastage of national resources and squandering of public assets and
funds.5 In spite of this concurrent jurisdiction, if at any point the IST demands of any
other Iraqi court to transfer cases involving crimes that the IST has jurisdiction over, the
national courts must transfer such cases to the IST.6 Primacy over the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes lies with the IST.7

3

IST Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 10, 14. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 4].

4

Id. at art. 10.

5

Id. at art. 29(a).

6

Id. at art. 29(c).

7

Id. at art. 29(b).

2

III.

KEY LESSONS THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL CAN LEARN FROM
THE ICTY, ICTR, AND SCSL

A.

Challenges to Legitimacy or Legality of International Criminal Tribunals
Lawyers hired by Saddam Hussein’s wife have publicly indicated that they will

argue that the IST lacks legitimacy, or lawful creation.8 During his first pre-trial hearing
in July, Hussein attacked the legitimacy of the IST, questioning the judge before him on
the law under which the IST was created.9 Hussein’s intention may be to follow in the
footsteps of Slobodan Milosevic who has been notoriously indignant in his refusal to
cooperate with the ICTY. Similar to Hussein, some of the accused before the ICTY,
ICTR, and SCSL have challenged the legitimacy of these tribunals. Notably, Dusko
Tadic and Milosevic questioned the legitimacy of the ICTY.
The ICTY, like the ICTR, was established by a Security Council resolution.10
Dusko Tadic, the first defendant to be tried by the ICTY, challenged the legality of the
ICTY. The ICTY Trial Chamber held that it was not competent to determine its legality.
This International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set
up to scrutinize the actions of organs of the United Nations.
It is, on the contrary, a criminal tribunal with clearly
defined powers, involving a quite specific and limited
criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its adjudications to

8

Rory McCarthy and Jonathan Steele, Saddam on Trial: Legitimacy and Neutrality of Court Will Be
Challenged, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2004, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1252096,00.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2004). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 51].
9

Rupert Cornwell, Saddam in the Dock: Listen to His Victims, Not Saddam, Says White House, THE
INDEPENDENT (London), July 2, 2004 (reporting that Hussein stated, “This is all theater,” at his first pretrial hearing) available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=537296 (last
visited Oct. 4, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 49].
10

See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 6].

3

those specific limits, it will have no authority to investigate
the legality of its creation by the Security Council.11
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tadic, however, disagreed
with the Trial Chamber and found that “its ‘inherent’ power to determine the propriety of
its own jurisdiction (competence de la competence) permitted review of the legality of the
Council’s actions in establishing the Tribunal.”12 It held that the ICTY had the power to
review its own legitimacy and that it was under the ambit of the Security Council’s broad
powers to establish the ICTY.13

The Appeals Chamber’s decision precluded Tadic from

bringing this issue to domestic courts to confirm the legality of the ICTY and it also
prevented him from raising the issue further during his trial.14
The Appeals Chamber made an important point in response to Tadic’s argument
that the ICTY was not “established by law,” which is a requirement set out in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).15 The Appeals Chamber
held that the requirement that the tribunal be “established by law” only requires that the
ICTY is “established in accordance with the proper international standards and that it
provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice, and even-handedness, in full conformity
11

Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No.: IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction, Aug. 10, 1995,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 29].

12

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES
TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 104 (Carolina Academic Press 1997) [hereinafter MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN
JUSTICE]. [Relevant chapter reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 34].
13

Id. at 105.

14

Id. at 104.

15

Id. at 105. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into
force March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 UNTS 171, reprinted in 6
ILM 368 (1967) at art. 14(1). Article 14(1) states, “All persons shall be equal before the courts and
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit
at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 2].

4

with internationally recognized human rights instruments.” 16 The Appeals Chamber
determined that the ICTY fulfilled these requirements and ultimately dismissed Tadic’s
appeal.
During his initial appearance before the ICTY on July 3, 2001, Milosevic verbally
announced his intention to challenge the legality of the establishment of the ICTY.17 In a
pre-trial motion, Milosevic stated, “I challenge the very legality of this court because it is
not established in the basis of law.”18 He argued that the ICTY was an illegal entity
because the Security Council did not have the power to establish it.19

He further argued

that his arrest and transfer to The Hague, the Netherlands, were unlawful because those
actions were in violation of Serbian and Yugoslav constitutions.20
The Trial Chamber held that the creation of the Tribunal was to “restore
international peace and security” and dismissed Milosevic’s motion. In its view, Security
Council Resolution 827 which established the ICTY, centered on the ICTY’s role of
promoting peace and reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. 21 Therefore, the Trial

16

MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 106. [Relevant chapter reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 34].
17

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.: IT-02-54, Transcript, July 3, 2001. (Milosevic stated, “I consider this
a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment. It is illegal being not appointed by the UN General
Assembly, so I have no need to appoint counsel to [sic] illegal organ.”). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook at Tab 20].

18

Milosevic Challenges the Legality of the U.N. Tribunal, ONLINE NEWSHOUR, Feb. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/february02/milosevic _2-13.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2004).
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 54].

19

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.: IT-02-54, Decision on Preliminary Motions, Nov. 8, 2001, at 3,
available at http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/1110873516829.htm (last visited Oct. 26,
2004) [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions]. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 23].

20
21

Id.
Id.

5

Chamber held that the creation of the ICTY was within the powers of the Security
Council under Article 39 22 and Article 4123 of the Charter of the United Nations and
accordingly dismissed his motion on this ground. 24 In determining whether the Trial
Chamber could determine the ICTY’s legitimacy, it deferred to the Appeals Chamber’s
decision in Tadic that the Tribunal had the competence to determine its own legality.25
The SCSL’s creation is substantially different from the creation of the ICTY and
ICTR. The SCSL was established by a treaty between the Government of Sierra Leone
and the United Nations to prosecute those with the greatest responsibility for violations of
international humanitarian law.26 In the Peace Agreement between the Government of
Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (“Lomé Amnesty
Agreement”), the Government of Sierra Leone granted blanket amnesty to all participants
in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Later, however, the Appeals Chamber of the SCSL
determined that the Lomé Amnesty Agreement was not valid before the SCSL.27 The
Appeals Chamber also declared that it was not vested with the power to determine its
22

U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (giving the Security Council the power to “determine the existence of any threat to
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and it “shall make recommendations, or decide what
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 . . . to maintain or restore international peace and
security”). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 8].

23

Id. at art. 41 (authorizing the Security Council to decide which “measures not involving the use of armed
force” will be taken to fulfill Article 39).
24

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Decision on Preliminary Motions, supra note 19, at 3. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 23].
25

Id. at 4.

26

Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, U.N.-Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scslagreement.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Agreement between the UN and Sierra Leone].
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 1].
27

Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara, Case No.: SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to
Jurisdiction: Lomé Accord Amnesty, Mar. 13, 2004, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-04-16-PT033-I.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 15].

6

own legality and explicitly stated that the ICTY’s Tadic decision was not binding on it.28
The Appeals Chamber articulated the SCSL’s legal basis in Prosecutor v. Charles
Taylor.29 It stated that although the SCSL was established in a different manner from the
ICTY and the ICTR, it was set up in a lawful manner by the Security Council which
derived its power from the United Nations Charter.30
If Saddam Hussein or any other defendant that is tried before the IST challenges
the legitimacy or legality of the IST, it is an important issue that the IST will need to fully
examine in light of the unique circumstances surrounding the creation of the IST. The
IST Trial Chamber or Appeals Chamber must determine whether it has the competency
to examine its own legality and the legality of the IST Statute. In any decision it makes
on these determinations, the IST should base its decision firmly in the law and craft an
opinion that will satisfy not only the Iraqis but also the entire world who will surely be
watching the actions of this Tribunal.
The IST’s analysis of its legitimacy will differ from the other ad hoc tribunals.
Unlike the ICTY and the ICTR, the IST was not created by a UN Security Council
resolution. And unlike the SCSL, the IST was not created by a treaty but was established
by the Coalition Provisional Authority prior to transfer of sovereignty back to Iraq.
28

Simon Meisenberg, The Lomé Amnesty Decision of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (June 28, 2004),
available at http://www.ifhv.de/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2
at Tab 52].

29

Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No.: SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, May 31,
2004, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/SCSL-03-01-I-059.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 30].
30

See id. at 18. (the Appeals Chamber stated, “[I]t was clear that the power of the Security Counsel to
enter into an agreement for the establishment of the court was derived from the Charter of the United
Nations both in regard to the general purposes of the United Nations as expressed in Article 1 of the
Charter and the specific powers of the Security Council in Articles 39 and 41. These powers are wide
enough to empower the Security Council to initiate, as it did by Resolution 1315, the establishment of the
Special Court by Agreement with Sierra Leone”)

7

Because the IST follows in time the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, it is only natural that it
should look to previous ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL decisions on legality and borrow and
apply similar logic and reasoning even though it may come to far different conclusions.

8

B.

The Tu Quoque Defense
The tu quoque defense has been attempted by individuals accused of war crimes,

crimes against humanity, and genocide in the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ICTY.
Likewise, Saddam Hussein may attempt to raise a tu tuoque defense and claim American
involvement in the crimes he is charged with. The Latin phrase tu quoque means “thou
also” or “you too.”31 A defendant raising the tu quoque defense claims justification for
his or her acts based on the actions of the state that was harmed or the state making the
accusation because it behaved in the same way as the accused.32 In other words, the
accused is saying, “You cannot fairly criticize me on that basis, for you are just as bad.
You are doing the same yourself.”33 The defense of tu quoque is not invoked to convince
the other side “to desist from its unlawful conduct . . . but as an estoppel against the
enemy’s subsequent attempt to call into question the lawfulness of the same kind of
conduct of the other side.”34
The tu quoque defense has had marginal success in the Nuremberg Tribunal and
the ICTY. At Nuremberg, only one defendant, Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, Commanderin-Chief of the German Navy from 1943 and succeeding to the position of Head of State
from Adolf Hitler in 1945, received a positive result from raising this defense.35 Donitz
31

Stephanie Berlin, The Tu Quoque Defense, Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTR,
Nov. 2002, at 4 [hereinafter Stephanie Berlin, The Tu Quoque Defense]. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 58]. See also, Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, 37 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 915, 925 (2003) [hereinafter Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial]. [Reproduced in
the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 43].
32

Id.
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Michael P. Scharf, The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial, supra note 31.

34

Stephanie Berlin, The Tu Quoque Defense, supra note 31, at 9.

35

Id. at 15.

9

was charged with waging unrestrictive submarine warfare, among other charges. In
response to this charge, his defense argued that his order forbidding German naval ships
from helping survivors from a sunken British vessel, the Laconia, was given because
American navy officers had an identical policy.36 Donitz’s defense procured evidence
from U.S. Admiral Chester Nimitz, commander of the American fleet in the Pacific, in
which the Admiral admitted that the U.S. Navy had a similar policy of unrestricted
submarine warfare.37 Instead of claiming that Donitz’s action was justified because the
Americans had a similar policy, Donitz’s defense argued that neither the German nor
American policy was illegal since “the universality of these acts demonstrated that the
laws of war had changed through practice so as to free them of their illegal character.”38
The Nuremberg Tribunal, without ever stating that it had accepted a tu quoque defense,
did not convict Donitz of unrestricted submarine warfare. In other cases at Nuremberg,
this defense was unsuccessful.
At the ICTY, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., the Trial Chamber
stated at the tu quoque defense is “irrelevant because it does not tend to prove or disprove
any of the allegations made in the indictment against the accused.”39 The Kupreskic case
involved six defendants who allegedly helped Bosnian Croat forces kill more than one

36
37
38

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.

39

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Case No.: IT-95-16, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the
Accused and the Defence of Tu Quoque, Feb. 17, 1999, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1
at Tab 17].
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hundred Bosnian civilians and destroying property including two mosques in 1993. 40
The six defendants sought to use a tu quoque defense and argue that Bosnian Muslims
committed atrocities against Bosnian Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.41 In rejecting
the tu quoque defense, the Trial Chamber reiterated its previous view that “the tu quoque
principle does not apply to international humanitarian law.”42 It further went on to state
that the obligations to comply with international humanitarian law are “designed to
safeguard fundamental human values and therefore must be complied with regardless of
the conduct of the other party or parties.” 43 The ICTY’s position on the tu quoque
defense seems to be that in no circumstance in ICTY proceedings can the tu quoque
defense be used to mitigate the responsibility of the accused when he or she is tried for
crimes in violation of international humanitarian law.
At the IST, Saddam Hussein and others charged at the IST may attempt to raise
the tu quoque defense and argue that the United States (who authorized the Iraqi
Governing Council to create the IST) illegally invaded Iraq or had involvement in the
actions which ultimately lead to the charges. While the Nuremberg and ICTY Tribunals’
policy of ignoring the tu quoque defense has drawn criticism that the policy reinforces the
notion of victor’s justice,44 the IST should be careful in analyzing the tu tuoque defense
so as not to appear to be enforcing that notion. The IST may have to allow Saddan
40

Stephanie Berlin, The Tu Quoque Defense, supra note 31, at 25. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 58].
41

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Decision on Evidence of the Good Character of the Accused and the Defence of
Tu Quoque, supra note 39, at 3. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 17].
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Stephanie Berlin, The Tu Quoque Defense, supra note 31, at 22. [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 58].
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Hussein to raise the issue of the invasion by the United States of Iraq in March 2003, in
the context of arguing that the definition of the crime of aggression is not clearly
established, much as the Nuremberg Tribunal allowed Donitz to raise Nimitz’s actions to
show that the law on submarine warfare was not clearly established. If faced with a
motion by the defense raising the tu quoque defense, the IST should look to the examples
set forth at Nuremberg and at the ICTY.

12

C.

Asserting the “Right to Self Representation”
The IST Statute states that the accused is guaranteed a right to self-

representation. 45 It has been predicted that Saddam Hussein will follow Slobodan
Milosevic’s lead and attempt to represent himself during his upcoming trial. Although
his wife has hired a team of international lawyers, Hussein may choose to assert a right to
self-representation having observed how successful Milosevic has been in representing
himself. During Hussein’s first appearance before the IST on July 1, 2004, he took the
opportunity to speak on his political views as well as verbally attack the 2003 invasion in
Iraq. This is very similar to the nature of Milosevic’s speeches before the ICTY and
therefore, it is not inconceivable that Hussein will attempt to represent himself, like
Milosevic, with an army of lawyers assisting him from behind the scenes.
The ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL vary in their treatment of the right to selfrepresentation. Famously, the ICTY allowed Milosevic to represent himself during his
trial which has been criticized by many observers. During Milosevic’s initial appearance
before the ICTY, he refused to enter a plea and declined to appoint legal representation.46
The prosecution raised their concern that Milosevic was unable to effectively represent
himself 47 The Trial Chamber denied the prosecution’s request for appointment of
counsel to Milosevic and found that while Milosevic has a right to counsel under

45

IST Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(d). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 5].

46

Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No.: IT-02-54, Transcript, July 3, 2001, supra note 17. [Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 20].
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In requesting that the ICTY consider appointing counsel in addition to amicus counsel, the prosecution
pointed out that Milosevic submitted a “confusing” motion which “if counsel were assigned to him, these
matters would not be as confusing.” Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Transcript, August 30, 2001, at 15.
[reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 21].
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customary international law, he also “has a right not to have counsel” and “to represent
himself.”48 The Chamber went on to say, “[I]t would not be practical to impose counsel
on an accused who wishes to represent himself . . . .”49 This decision enabled Milosevic
to turn the ICTY Trial Chambers into his own personal stage for making “unfettered
speeches throughout the trial” and treating the prosecution, witnesses and the trial
chamber judges in a way that would never be permitted of ordinary defense counsel.50
During this same initial appearance, the Trial Chamber appointed amicus curiae
counsel. The Trial Chamber chose to appoint amicus curiae because the Court was able
to avoid imposing counsel on Milosevic and it did not compromise the right to self
representation.51 The amicus curiae’s role was not to represent Milosevic, but rather to
ensure Milosevic would get a fair trial by assisting the Trial Chamber in the proper
administration of justice. However, appointing amicus curiae was not a perfect solution
“as the amicus counsel is not a party to the trial and may disturb the adversarial nature of
the proceeding.”52 Despite the appointment of amicus curiae, throughout his trial, rather
than defending himself against the charges, he used his time in court to “play on Serbia’s

48
49

Id. at 18.
Id.
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Michael P. Scharf and Christopher M. Rassi, Do Former Leaders Have an International Right to SelfRepresentation in War Crimes Trials?, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2004). [Reproduced
in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 42].
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Simon Meisenberg, The Right to Self Representation Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, June 19,
2004, available at http://www.ifhv.de/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying
notebook 2 at Tab 53].

52

Id.
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psychological vulnerabilities and continued Serb resentment of the 1999 NATO
bombing.”53
In June 2004, it became apparent that for health reasons Milosevic would not be
able to continue defending himself before the ICTY. 54 His defense was postponed
numerous times on account of his ill health and on September 22, 2004, the Trial
Chamber concluded that Milosevic was not fit to represent himself and that if he did
continue to do so, there would be further delays.55 The Trial Chamber found that the
right to self representation is not absolute and that the Trial Chamber is competent to
assign counsel “in the interests of justice.” 56 The Trial Chamber stated that “[t]he
fundamental duty of the Trial Chamber is to ensure that the trial is fair and expeditious”
and it decided to assign counsel to Milosevic.57 Milosevic’s amicus curiae appealed the
Trial Chamber decision and on November 1, 2004, the ICTY Appeals Chamber ruled that
Milosevic had a right to defend himself but that he must have standby counsel if his
“health problems resurface with sufficient gravity.”58
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Id. at 3, citing Dusko Doder, Book Review of Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia by
Louis Sell, THE NATION, May 27, 2002, at 25. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 37].
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The ICTR in Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza did not follow the lead of the ICTY in
Milosevic and imposed counsel on the accused in the interest of justice.59 Barayagwiza
filed a motion with the Trial Chamber to withdraw his counsel’s mandate to represent
him.

The Trial Chamber refused to grant his motion and held that, “[O]nly in

‘exceptional circumstances’ will Counsel assigned by the Tribunal represent an accused
to be permitted to withdraw from the case.”60 The Trial Chamber further stated that
appointed counsel “are under obligation to continue to represent an accused to the best of
his ability, unless the Chamber decides that they are permitted to withdraw.”61 The Trial
Chamber observed that Barayagwiza did not lack confidence in his lawyers and that the
reason he wanted to withdraw them was because he did not believe he would be given a
fair trial. 62 The Trial Chamber found this allegation to be without foundation and
rejected Barayagwiza’s motion because it was “merely boycotting the trial and
obstructing the course of justice.”63
The SCSL encountered the issue of self-representation in Prosecutor v. Norman.64
In that case, Sam Hinga Norman, the former Minister of Interior Affairs of Sierra Leone,

59

Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No.: ICTR-97-19-T, Decision on Defence Counsel Motion to Withdraw,
Nov. 2, 2000, available at http://www.ictr.org/default.htm. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1
at Tab 10].
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Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Decision on the Application of Samuel Hinga Norman
for Self Representation Under Article 17(4)(d) of the Statute of the Special Court, June 8, 2004.
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 25].
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was jointly charged with two other persons of crimes against humanity and war crimes.65
Just after the prosecutor’s opening statements, Norman notified the Trial Chamber that he
decided to defend himself. 66 During pre-trial hearings and motions, Norman was
represented by counsel that he had picked. Although the Trial Chamber stated that it was
“[m]indful of the International Human Rights norms which guarantee both a right of selfrepresentation and a right of legal assistance,”67 it rejected Norman’s request for three
reasons. First, Norman was being tried with two co-defendants. Allowing Norman to
represent himself would be “to the detriment of the rights of his two co-accused to a fair
and expeditious trial.” 68 Second, Norman waited until after the prosecutor’s opening
statements “after over a year of pre-trial detention” and if he assumed his own defense, it
“would necessarily result in unnecessarily prolonging the proceedings.69 Third, the right
to self-representation was not absolute, but a qualified right.70 The Trial Chamber agreed
with a U.S. court decision which said that self-representation “threatens to divert criminal
trials from their clearly defined purpose of providing a fair and reliable determination of
guilt or innocence.”71
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Simon Meisenberg, The Right to Self Representation Before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra
note 41. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 53].
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The SCSL eventually assigned standby counsel to Norman, while preserving his
right to self-representation.72 The Trial Chamber defined the role of standby counsel
stating that they would “assist [him] in the exercise of [his] self-representation . . .
preparation and presentation of [his] case during the trial phase . . . offer legal advice . . .
and address the Court whenever [he] request[s] them to address the Court.” 73 The
SCSL’s decision to appoint standby counsel was a departure from the ICTY’s decision to
appoint amicus curiae. Standby counsel differs from amicus curiae in that they are party
to the trial and do not disturb the adversarial process.74
The IST should look carefully to the most analogous case – Prosecutor v.
Milosevic in the ICTY. Like Milosevic, Hussein is a former head of state. In addition,
Hussein and Milosevic are notorious for their alleged war crimes. Like Milosevic’s trial
before the ICTY, Hussein’s trial is likely to be intently observed not just by Iraqis but by
the world community. Although the IST Statute states that the accused has the right to
self-representation, it is ambiguous on whether this right is absolute. If granted the right
to self-representation, Hussein, like Milosevic, will be given a world stage upon which he
will be given the opportunity to disrupt the proceedings of the IST and make speeches
intended not to help in his defense, but to stir up the emotions of the Iraqi people and to
disturb the course of justice. The IST should look to the analyses of its predecessors in
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Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Transcript, June 10, 2004, available at http://www.scsl.org/Transcripts/CDF-061004.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
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evaluating whether the right to self-representation is an absolute right and under what
circumstances the Trial Chamber can assign counsel.

19

D.

Standard of Competence for Attorneys
The Special Tribunal Statute does not provide guidelines on the standard of

attorney competence.

However, the Statute does provide for the right to self

representation or legal assistance of the defendant’s choosing.75 The Statute also ensures
that a defendant who does not have the means to pay for legal counsel has the right to
have counsel assigned by the IST at no cost to the defendant.76 There is an ongoing
dispute in the media between the IST and the lawyers hired by Saddam Hussein’s wife.
While Hussein’s lawyers are claiming that they are not being granted access to Hussein,
the IST has countered that the lawyers have not been recognized by Iraqi authorities. As
the IST addresses the issue of attorney competence, it should strive to fully respect the
rights of all of the accused that stand before it and comply with international standards of
human rights.
In the ICTY, a defense counsel is considered qualified to represent defendants if
the Registrar is satisfied that he or she:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

75
76

is admitted to the practice of law in a State, or is a
university professor of law;
has written and oral proficiency in [English or
French], unless the Registrar deems it in the
interests of justice to waive this requirement;
is a member in good standing of an association of
counsel practicing at the [ICTY] recognised by the
Registrar;
has not been found guilty or otherwise disciplined
in relevant disciplinary proceedings against him in a
national or international forum, including
proceedings pursuant to the Code of Professional
Conduct for Defence Counsel Appearing Before the

IST Statute, supra note 1, at art. 20(d)(4). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 5].
Id.
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(v)
(vi)

(vii)

[ITCY], unless the Registrar deems that, in the
circumstances, it would be disproportionate to
exclude such counsel;
has not been found guilty in relevant criminal
proceedings;
has not engaged in conduct whether in pursuit of his
or her profession or otherwise which is dishonest or
otherwise discreditable to counsel, prejudicial to the
administration of justice, or likely to diminish
public confidence in the [ICTY] or the
administration of justice, or otherwise bring the
[ICTY] into disrepute; and
has not provided false or misleading information in
relation to his or her qualifications and fitness to
practice or failed to provide relevant information.77

The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“ICTR RPE”) requires only that defense
counsel be “admitted to the practice of law in a State, or is a University professor of
law.”78
The Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadic held “the essential characteristic of
a tribunal ‘established by law’ is that it ‘genuinely afford the accused the full guarantees
of fair trial set out in Art. 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.’”79 Article 14 of the ICCPR provides, among others, a “fair and public hearing
by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”80 The ICTY and
ICTR provide guidelines for the IST’s own rules of procedure and evidence. The ICTY
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Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, rule
44. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 1 at Tab 3].
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Melanie Popper, Standard of Competence for Attorneys Who Represent Defendants Before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Memorandum for the Office of the Prosecutor, Dec. 2000, at
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See International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, supra note 15. [Reproduced in the
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and ICTR standards for attorney qualifications ensure that defendants are represented by
competent attorneys who satisfy minimum international human rights standards.
Attorney competence is an issue the IST should carefully examine as it has
implications for effective representation of defendants. The IST should ensure that
attorneys who appear before it, including prosecutors, meet the minimum standards as set
out in international law, including the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (“ICTY
RPE”) and the ICTR RPE.

The IST should also look to the International Bar

Association 81 and the American Bar Association 82 which have programs for training
defense counsel who are to appear in war crimes trials.
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For information on the International Bar Association’s programs on human rights and humanitarian law
training, please call Mahmuda Ali at +44 (0)20-7629-1206, or email questions to mahmuda.ali@int-bar.org.
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For information on the American Bar Association’s programs on human rights and humanitarian law
training, please call +1(202) 662-1000, or email questions to intllaw@abanet.org.
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E.

The Importance of Building an Initial Prosecutorial Strategy
Unlike the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL, the IST has no limits as to the level of the

perpetrators to be prosecuted. Because of limited resources and judges, the IST cannot
prosecute everyone accused of crimes under the jurisdiction of the IST. Thus, the IST
should create a prosecutorial strategy. “A successful initial prosecutorial strategy . . .
stems from a mandate that can be established within the political expectations of a
reluctant international community.”83 This mandate should not be too vague for there is a
greater chance that the mandate will be frustrated or even fail.84 A workable mandate is
one that is specific and can be reasonably accomplished while keeping in mind the budget
and timeframes originally contemplated as well as the true purpose of the tribunal – to
help victims whose lives were destroyed by the acts of the accused.85 The SCSL is a
good example of how a specific mandate was implemented into action by a prosecutor
who understood that an initial prosecutorial strategy was necessary for a successful
international tribunal.
To develop an initial prosecutorial strategy, it is important to build the
prosecution and support teams around a general strategy which should be developed
before deployment. 86 Building the prosecution office around the strategy allows for
efficient hiring of the prosecution staff which will accomplish the mandate. 87 An

83

David Crane, Address at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Klatsky Lecture (Oct. 27,
2004). [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at Tab 66].
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efficient hiring will reduce the occurrence of endemic “hall walkers” syndrome which is
found in some international organizations.88 The initial prosecutorial strategy should be
planned out as far in advance as possible.
The SCSL Prosecutor immediately mapped out his prosecutorial strategy in the
first two months he was appointed.89 He planned his strategy to be executed according to
the SCSL’s mandate which was to “prosecute persons who bear the greatest
responsibility for the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law
and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law.”90 The operative words in the SCSL’s
mandate are “greatest responsibility.” 91 The inclusion of these words in the SCSL
mandate meant that the Court would not cast a wide net but would prosecute and hold
accountable the warlords with the greatest responsibility for the murder, rape, maiming,
and mutilation of over 500,000 people. 92

Focusing on those with the greatest

responsibility would allow the SCSL to be efficient and effective in dispensing justice
while staying within its budgetary and time constraints.93
The SCSL Prosecutor’s strategy also included timed phases from pre-deployment
all the way to trial and did not deviate from this strategy.94 The SCSL Prosecutor also
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Agreement between the UN and the Sierra Leone, supra note 26, at para. 1. [Reproduced in the
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time phased the Office of the Prosecutor’s movement into Sierra Leone.95 The Office of
the Prosecutor started by putting into place its support system, investigators, and finally
trial counsel.96 The SCSL Prosecutor also sought to develop connections with domestic
players such as the Sierra Leone government, non-governmental organizations, and the
people of Sierra Leone. 97

In addition, the Prosecutor sought to understand the

international dynamics affecting the SCSL trials. These international players included
States, international criminal cartels, corporations, terrorists, and heads of state who
engaged in joint criminal enterprises.98
In addition to developing an initial prosecutorial strategy which accomplishes the
mandate of the IST, it is important for the Prosecutor of the IST to set a “new standard in
judicial effectiveness that begins to establish a respect for legal institutions.”99 This is
especially important in Iraq where the legal system is being rebuilt and where a renewed
respect for fair judicial processes and the rule of law is a legacy that the IST can leave
behind.
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F.

Gaining Credibility in the Community: The Importance of an Effective
Outreach Program
The IST Statute provides for the hiring of a “public relations expert” to give

“regular briefings to the press and the public at large with respect to the developments
relating to the Tribunal.” 100 One of the reasons of trying Saddam Hussein and his
associates is to bring justice and reconciliation to Iraq for the horrors its people endured
under his rule. In addition to a hiring a public relations expert, to be effective in
achieving these aims, the IST must develop a good outreach program to inform the Iraqis
of “the IST’s plans, including the proposed timeframe for its activity, and what the IST
intends to achieve within it.” 101 If the IST does not develop an effective outreach
program and does not inform Iraqis of its mandate and its process, the IST risks not being
“seen as a credible contributor to justice and stability.”102 It is important for the IST to
explain to Iraqis the nature of the indictments it issues and to proceed throughout the
trials in an open and transparent manner.103
The ICTY’s Outreach Programme’s mandate is to “bridge the divide separating
the [ICTY] in The Hague from the communities it serves in the states and territories that
have emerged from the former Yugoslavia.”104 Despite its mandate, many regard the
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ICTY to have failed at developing and implementing an effective outreach program –
instead of focusing on the people in the region that the ICTY concerned, the ICTY
reached out primarily to its international donors and diplomatic supporters, which has
contributed to widespread misunderstanding and lack of credibility in the eyes of many in
the region.105 As explained further below in Section I, Milosevic has been able to gain
the sympathy and support of many in the former Yugoslavia despite the atrocities for
which he is being tried.
An illustration of the ICTY’s failure to inform the people in country is the
widespread misunderstandings of the people of the former Yugoslavia which continued
during the trials. For example, in 2003, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, a former judge and
President of the ICTY, told of a story where notwithstanding the 301-page judgment
against Tadic, which included “a detailed description of the horrors of the Omarska and
Keraterm camps, many in the region still believed the tale that these were ‘collection
centers,’ temporarily housing those who desired to leave the Prijedor area.”106 Thus, the
ICTY has largely failed at playing a reconciliatory role in the region.107 To this day, the
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Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal, supra note 101. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook 2 at
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ICTY does not have outreach factored into its budget; the outreach function is instead
funded solely by voluntary contributions from outsiders.108
Similar to the experience of the ICTY, the ICTR has also largely failed to reach
out to Rwandans and educate them on the ICTR. The Rwandan government is one of the
most outspoken critics of the ICTR and its negative views of the ICTY is reflected in
Rwandan popular opinion.109 The majority of Rwandans’ knowledge of the ICTY and its
operations is “extraordinarily low.” 110 In a survey conducted in February 2002, only
0.7% of respondents stated they were “well informed” and 10% “informed” about the
work of the ICTR.111 55% of those surveyed claimed to be “not well informed” and
31.3% were “not at all informed.”112 In addition, a majority of Rwandans feel that the
ICTR is “a useless institution, an expedient mechanism for the international community
to absolve itself of its responsibilities for the genocide and its tolerance of the crimes of
the [Rwandan Patriotic Front].”113
The SCSL, learning from the ICTY and ICTR’s failures to conduct effective
outreach programs, has placed a strong emphasis on community outreach from the
108
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Court’s inception. The SCSL’s outreach program is widely considered to have played a
large role in garnering credibility among the local population. 114

The SCSL has

conducted its outreach program through “town hall forums around the country, ongoing
communications through local media, and regular meetings and consultations with a
broad range of civil society representatives.”115 The Outreach section of the SCSL has
also included the involvement of the Prosecutor, David Crane, who for four months
traveled the Sierra Leone countryside and visited every district and every major town.116
Mr. Crane felt it important to meet the people of Sierra Leone and hear first-hand their
stories of the tragedies that befell them.117
In addition to town hall meetings, consultations, and communications through
local media, the SCSL’s outreach program created “The Special Court Made Simple,” a
booklet aimed at making the SCSL’s “mission and procedures more accessible to Sierra
Leoneans, especially those at the village level.”118 This booklet explains key concepts
relating to the SCSL in simple language and is accompanied by illustrations that
communicate the written words. Included in the booklet are sections on each step of the
investigative and trial steps and has sections such as “Who will the Special Court Try?”,
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“Why was the Special Court for Sierra Leone Created?”, and “How Does the Special
Court Work?”
Following the example of the SCSL, the IST should explore the possibility of
developing an outreach program immediately. It is important to inform the Iraqi public
of how the IST works and why it has been created. As seen in the regions affected by the
ICTY and the ICTR, if the IST fails to develop an effective outreach program, it risks
being dismissed by an indifferent and or uninformed Iraqi public as a Court that does not
have much significance. Although the current security situation may preclude launching
some aspects of an outreach program in the near future, the IST should start planning an
outreach program and implement initiatives such as publication of a booklet modeled on
that provided by the SCSL as soon as possible. As the security situation improves, the
IST can take other steps to inform the Iraqi public of its mandate and mission. The IST
should do its utmost to ensure that ordinary Iraqis see that the IST is fair in the
administration of justice and should take steps to dispel the notion that the IST is a
“kangaroo court.”
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G.

Protection of Witnesses
The rights of the accused versus the requirement of protection of victims and

witnesses has been raised numerous times in the ICTY. Frequently in international
criminal tribunals, cooperation by witnesses largely hinges on the provision of witness
protection.119 This issue was first raised in the trial of Dusko Tadic. Much to the chagrin
of many ICTY observers, the prosecutor was forced to abandon rape charges after its
only rape witness refused to testify. 120 She explained that she and her family were
threatened and that she was no longer willing to testify because of the threats.121
An international court or tribunal’s ability to protect witnesses directly affects its
legitimacy.122 If criminals are able to intimidate witnesses and an international court or
tribunal is unable to protect them, witnesses will not testify in the courtroom and the
judicial process will be rendered ineffective. The issue of protection of witnesses is
important as a court’s legitimacy may suffer if any of its witnesses are harmed.123
The ICTY Statute guarantees the accused the right “to examine, or have examined,
the witnesses against him.”124 Following the adoption of the ICTY Statute, the ICTY
RPE were drafted and adopted. ICTY RPE Rule 69 provides for the protection of victims
and witnesses. It states that in exceptional circumstances, the prosecutor may request to a
119
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judge or the Trial Chamber that the identity of a particular victim or witness who is in
danger be shielded until that person is brought under the protection of the ICTY. 125
Subject to rules providing for specific measures, the identity of victims or witnesses shall
be disclosed to the defense to allow sufficient time to prepare his or her case.126
Specific measures provided for victims and witnesses include non-disclosure of
identity to the public or media of their identity or their whereabouts.127 For example,
names may be expunged from public court records or testimony may be given through
voice-altering devices.128 The ICTY has also created a Victims and Witnesses Section.
The Victims and Witnesses Section is a specialized section within the ICTY Registry that
provides assistance to victims and witnesses. There are three units of the Victims and
Witnesses Section: “the Protection Unit which co-ordinates responses to the security
requirements, the Support Unit which provides social and psychological counseling and
assistance to witnesses, and the Operations Unit which is responsible for logistical
operations and witness administration.”129 The Victims and Witnesses Unit duties range
from assisting witnesses with disabilities travel to the seat of the ICTY to assisting in the
temporary or permanent relocation of witnesses where there are serious threats to their
lives.130
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Although the protection of victims and witnesses is provided for in the ICTY
Statute and the ICTY RPE, it is important to balance the need to protect witnesses against
the right of the accused to have a fair trial and have the opportunity to confront witnesses
that testify against them. As mentioned above, the issue of witness protection was raised
in the ICTY’s first case, Prosecutor v. Tadic. The ICTY prosecutor’s office filed a
motion requesting protection of applicable witnesses.131 They asked that some of the
witnesses’ identities be kept from the public and the media.132 For other witnesses, the
prosecution asked that their identities be completely shielded from the accused or his
lawyers.133 The Trial Chamber granted the prosecution’s request to keep the witness
identities from the public and the media finding that Rule 75 of the ICTY RPE explicitly
provided for such measures.134
However, the Trial Chamber did not find that the ICTY RPE authorized the
prosecution’s motion on witness anonymity.135 The Trial Chamber created a five-prong
test which must be satisfied in order to grant a motion of witness anonymity.136 They are:
1) there must be “an existence of a real fear for the safety
of the witness;”
2) the prosecution must show that the witness’s testimony
is “sufficiently relevant and important to the case;”
3) “there must be no prima facie evidence of the witness’s
unworthiness in any way;”
4) there is no witness protection program in existence; and
131
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5) there are no less restrictive protective measures
available.137
The Trial Chamber ruled that if the defendant is given the opportunity to examine
the anonymous witness, the defendant’s rights have not been violated.138
The following procedural guidelines were also adopted by the Trial Chamber in
Prosecutor v. Tadic:
1) judges must be able to observe the demeanour of the
witness ‘in order to assess the reliability of the
testimony’;
2) judges must be aware of the identity of the witness;
3) the defence must be allowed ample opportunity to
question the witness on matters unrelated to identity or
current whereabouts;
4) the identity of the witness must be disclosed where
there is no longer any reason to fear for his/her
safety.139
There have been several cases in the ICTY where witnesses were harassed or
intimated by defendants. In 1999, the ICTY found Milan Vujin guilty of “interfering
with witnesses in a manner which dissuaded them from telling the truth.”140 Vujin was
fined 15,000NLG (£4,120). Later, defense counsel for Tihomir Blaškić was found in
contempt and fined for disclosing the identity and occupation of a protected witness.141
The ICTY in the trial of Blaškić held:
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the victims and witnesses merit protection, even from the
accused, during the preliminary proceedings and continuing
until a reasonable time before the state of the trial itself;
from that time forth, however, the right of the accused to an
equitable trial must take precedence and require that the
veil of anonymity be lifted in his favour, even if the veil
must continue to obstruct the view of the public and the
media.142
IST prosecutions will be largely dependant on witness testimony. Therefore, the
IST should draft rules of procedure and evidence that will reduce the trauma to witnesses
resulting from testifying that is balanced against the defendant’s right to confront his or
her witnesses. Some commentators have suggested that international tribunals could
appeal to UN member countries to grant political asylum and new identities to victims
and witnesses, as they are in the category of persecuted ethnic minorities and could
qualify for refugee status.143 The IST may wish to persuade countries to grant asylum to
the witnesses that will be in danger on account of their testimony. 144 However, one
problem that may arise is that witnesses may level false claims in the hope of escaping
Iraq.

With the important testimony to be garnered from witnesses and the current

security situation in Iraq, the IST should also create a Victims and Witnesses Section to
facilitate the participation of witnesses in IST trials.
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H.

The Preference for Live Witness Testimony
If the ICTY trials have been a harbinger of things to come in the IST, the issue of

live testimony will surely be a contentious issue that the IST judges should examine
carefully. There has been sharp criticism of the ICTY’s problem of lagging trials which
is attributed in part to the substantial amount of witness testimony. ICTY trials, on
average, have a hundred witnesses or more and each witness’ testimony takes up a full
day.145 Much of witness testimony in the ICTY involves “background events leading up
to indicated offenses, jurisdictional prerequisites to the charges, the impact of the alleged
crimes on the victims, or factors that aggravate or mitigate the accused’s guilt.”146
In an effort to cut down on long and drawn out testimony that is repetitive or
testimony that does not go directly to the heart of the charges against the accused, the
ICTY has looked for ways to shorten the amount of time-consuming testimony and to
ensure speedier trials. The ICTY RPE, which among others, includes provisions related
to testimony of witnesses, were formulated in 1994.147 Since 1994, these provisions have
undergone numerous revisions in response to time-consuming trials and outside pressure
to fulfill its mandate to try individuals “without undue delay.”148
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The original ICTY RPE strongly preferred live testimony of witnesses rather than
the use of written witness testimony. Article 21(4)(e) of the Statute of the ICTY entitles
the accused “to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him”149 and Rule 90
previously said that “witnesses shall, in principle, be heard directly by the Chambers.”150
However, Rule 89 of the ICTY RPE confers broad discretionary power to the Chamber to
“admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative value.”151 The original
Rule 71 of the ICTY RPE, dealing with depositions, stated that witness depositions shall
be used only in “exceptional circumstances” at trial.152 Later, Rule 94ter was added to
the ICTY RPE to allow affidavits “to prove a fact in dispute” where the affidavit,
completed in accordance with the RPE, corroborated the live testimony of a witness.”153
Under this rule, if the other party objected, and the Trial Chamber agreed with the
objecting party, then the witness was required to be present to be cross-examined.154 In
1999, the ICTY amended the ICTY RPE omitting the requirement of finding
“exceptional circumstances” before the Trial Chamber can order that a deposition be
taken for use at trial.155
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Today, Rule 94ter allowing for the use of affidavits “to prove a fact in dispute”
does not exist and has been replaced by Rule 92bis. Rule 92bis has been amended to
allow for the admission of affidavits, completed in accordance with the ICTY RPE, in
lieu of live testimony only if it “goes to proof of a matter other than the acts and conduct
of the accused as charged in the indictment.”156 As before, if the other party objects, and
the Trial Chambers so rules, the witness must appear for cross-examination. 157 Rule
92bis is the ICTY’s attempt to return to the original preference of the ICTY RPE to hear
live witness testimony and allow cross-examination. However, Rule 92bis does not
assure the right of cross-examination with regard to the content of the affidavit submitted
pursuant to it.
In 2002, in Prosecutor v. Milosevic, the Prosecutor sought to introduce the written
statements of twenty-three witnesses pursuant to Rule 92bis. These written statements
regarded events such as “attacks, killings and assaults in Kosovo, events that constitute
the widespread or systematic campaign of terror and violence that the Prosecution
charged the accused with having committed.”158 The Prosecution sought to introduce
these statements to prove a “crime base” as the statements pertained to crimes committed
in Kosovo but not to the specific acts of Milosevic and thus under the ambit of the Rule.
The Trial Chamber eventually allowed the written testimony with the right of Milosevic
to cross-examine the witnesses.
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The Appeals Chamber clarified the scope of Rule 92bis in Prosecutor v. Galic,
stating: “where the evidence is so pivotal to the Prosecution case, and where the person
whose acts and conduct the written statement describes is so proximate to the accused,
the Trial Chamber may decide that it would be fair to the accused to permit the evidence
to be given in written form.”159 The Appeals Chamber held that parties may use Rule
92bis to submit written testimony on the acts and conduct of others to establish the state
of mind of the accused with respect to the charges.160 The Appeals Chamber’s decision
clarifying the scope of Rule 92bis has binding effect on all Trial Chambers.
It is clear from the history of the Tribunal’s amendments of the provisions on
written testimony that live testimony, while preferred, is not always required. It has been
said that Rule 92bis “appears to have had a dramatic impact on the way in which parties,
and in particular the Prosecution, are seeking to present their cases before the [ICTY].”161
While a literal reading of Rule 92bis only allows the admittance of written testimony
which does not go to the acts and conduct of others, some say the Appeals Chamber’s
binding decision allows the introduction of written testimony to be used as “background
or peripheral evidence.”162 163
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I.

The Effects of Televising Trials
Although public accountability for the Saddam Hussein trial will be through

television cameras in the courtroom, there are risks that this medium will be used to
Saddam Hussein’s advantage much like Slobodan Milosevic. There are hopes that
televising Saddam Hussein trial will show Iraqis a fair judicial process, help Iraqis heal
and reassure the public that justice is being carried out. However, there are fears that
Saddam Hussein will take a chapter out of Milosevic’s trial book and attempt to use the
same or similar courtroom antics for which Milosevic is well known.
Rule 78 of the ICTY RPE states, “All proceedings before a Trial Chamber, other
than deliberations of the Chamber, shall be held in public, unless otherwise provided.”164
In an effort achieve one of its aims of helping Serbs, Croats, Albanians and Bosnian
Muslims heal their wounds from atrocities committed during wars in the former
Yugoslavia, the ICTY televises the Milosevic trial among others. However, Milosevic
has been able to use this medium to his advantage and endear himself to Serbs. There is
much criticism that televising the Milosevic trial has improved Milosevic’s standing at
home in Serbia. The daily televised trial is a highly rated show through which Milosevic
has “stirred admiration and sympathy” in Serbia.165
As mentioned before, Milosevic has represented himself during his trial. He
appears on television screens back in Serbia as “a solitary individual pitted against an
army of foreign lawyers and investigators” which has helped to “boost his underdog
164
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appeal.” 166 Moreover, the manner of Milosevic’s “sharp”, “funny”, and “cynical”
courtroom dramatics has garnered him admiration in Serbia.167 It has also been reported
in opinion polls that 75% of Serbs “do not feel that Milosevic is getting a fair trial.”168
Also, 67% of Serbs think that Milosevic is “not responsible for any war crimes.”169
The use of television cameras in U.S. courtrooms has been the subject of much
debate. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”170
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the effect of cameras in the courtroom
in 1965 in Estes v. Texas, a criminal case involving an accused embezzler.171 In Estes,
the U.S. Supreme Court agreed with defendant Estes, that he was deprived of a fair trial
due to the disruptive media presence in the Texas court that tried him.172 The Court held
that while U.S. law favors public proceedings, this safeguard does not require the
privilege of televised and audio recorded proceedings: “It is true that the public has the
right to be informed as to what occurs in its courts, but reporters of all media, including
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television, are always present if they wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever
occurs in open court through their respective media.”173
Several legal commentators and scholars in the United States have articulated the
pros and cons of televising criminal trials in the United States. Some of the benefits of
televised criminal trials mentioned are: they educate the public on the criminal justice
system and the law; 174 they have therapeutic and cathartic value for victims and the
public; and they allow the public to act as a check on the judicial process.175 In spite of
some of the benefits that televising trials bring, there are oft-cited reasons for excluding
cameras from courtrooms in the United States which affect fair trial prospects for
defendants such as: “[t]he presence of broadcast media can inhibit witnesses” from
testifying, thereby, impairing the ability of the prosecution and defense from obtaining
evidence;176 cameras “may allow judges and lawyers to play to the cameras creating a
celebrity status for them” thus depriving defendants effective counsel and fair and
impartial decisions by judges; 177 and “heightened public clamor resulting from . . .
television coverage will inevitably result in prejudice.”178
In determining whether a trial should be televised, U.S. courts in different
jurisdictions have varying criteria on whether trials should be televised. For example,
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some jurisdictions outright prohibit televising trials, while others allow cameras in
courtrooms in certain cases and provide guidelines for the media on media coverage.179
For example, according to Missouri law and a set of guidelines published by the Missouri
Supreme Court, media coverage is not permitted in a courtroom without the express
permission of the trial judge.180 In Missouri, a trial judge may deny permission for media
coverage if he or she finds that “media coverage would interfere materially with the
rights of a party to a fair trial.”181 The Missouri guidelines list the responsibilities of the
media and guidelines on equipment.182
While there was positive potential in televising Milosevic’s trial at the ICTY, it is
clear that he has been able to use television coverage of his trial to his advantage by
weakening its aims by endearing himself to the Serbs and discrediting the ICTY at every
turn. The problems posed by Milosevic do not lie solely with the ICTY’s decision to
televise his trial, but it is evident that television is a powerful medium that can be abused
by Saddam Hussein during his trial. While the IST Statute provides that the IST hearings
“shall be public unless the Trial Chamber decides to close the proceedings,” it should
look to the example of the ICTY and the impact of televising Milosevic’s trial in
whole. 183 In addition, the IST should refer to the jurisprudence and analyses in the
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United States on televising fair trials which have been developing for the last twenty-five
years.
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J.

The Role of Fair Trial Observers
The IST Statute requires the President of the IST to appoint non-Iraqi trial

observers or advisers. 184 The role of these appointed observers or advisers are to
“provide assistance to the judges with respect to international law and the experience of
similar tribunals (whether international or otherwise), and to monitor the protection by
the Tribunal of general due process of law standards.”185 If needed, the President of the
IST may call upon the international community for assistance. 186 The IST Statute
requires that observers or advisers be “persons of high moral character, impartiality and
integrity.”187 The IST Statute has a decided preference for persons who “have acted in
either a judicial or prosecutorial capacity in his or her respective country,” or persons
who “have experience in international war crimes trials or tribunals.”188
Fair trial observers (“FTO”) have been used as far back as 1498 and since the end
of World War II, they have become more accepted within the framework of customary
international law. 189 Recently, FTOs have been selected from politically unbiased
nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”).190 FTOs, formal observers of trials, play an
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important role in ensuring the effective and fair administration of justice by observing
trial processes and applying legal know-how and training.191
FTOs have yet to be used in international criminal tribunals.192 However, there
have arguably been trials where the participation of FTOs would have helped in past
international criminal tribunal cases. The key goals of a trial observer, according to the
International Commission of Jurists’ Guidelines are as follows:
1) to make known to the court, the authorities of the
country and to the general public the interest in and
concern for the trial in question;
2) to encourage a court to give the accused a fair trial. The
impact of an observer’s presence in a courtroom cannot
be evaluated with mathematical precision. However,
both observers and defense attorneys have pointed out
that a monitor’s presence often changes the atmosphere
in the courtroom and facilitates defense by, inter alia,
making the court more cognizant of the defense’s
arguments, encouraging defense counsel and the
defendant to be more forceful in contesting the
prosecution’s claims, in attracting media attention to the
trial, etc.’
3) to obtain more information about the conduct of the
trial, the nature of the case against the accused and the
legislation under which s/he is being tried; and
4) to collect general background information about the
political and legal circumstances leading to the trial and
possibility affecting its outcome.193
In spite of the many benefits FTOs may bring to the IST, the IST should be aware
of the potential downside of FTOs. For the trial of the two persons accused with the
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 (the “Lockerbie trial”), the United Nations appointed Dr.
Hans Köechler, a professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Innsbruck, Austria,
191
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to observe the trial pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1192, adopted on August 27,
1998.194 Dr. Köechler delivered a damning report of the administration of justice at the
Lockerbie trial claiming that the outcome of the trial was politically motivated and “not
fair.” 195 Dr. Köechler’s report unleashed a torrent of criticism. In response to Dr.
Köechler’s report, a spokesman for the Crown Office, which handled the Lockerbie trial,
replied that Dr. Köechler had “completely misunderstood” the trial. 196 Similarly, a
member of the Lockerbie briefing unit said that Dr. Köechler displayed a “profound
misunderstanding” of the Scottish adversarial system.197
Following Dr. Köechler’s report, there were disagreements between Dr. Köechler
and the United Nations on his role as an international observer of the Lockerbie trial. In
response to criticism of Dr. Köechler’s report, Hans Corell, the Under-Secretary-General
for Legal Affairs of the United Nations, made a statement which distanced the United
Nations from the report.198 Mr. Corell insisted that Dr. Köechler’s remarks constituted
his “personal views” and that the “United Nations cannot be associated with the
observations made” by Dr. Köechler and the other observers.199 Mr. Corell also stated
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that Dr. Köechler was “not required to produce and submit” his observations and that he
represented his own organization, the International Progress Organization, not the United
Nations at the Lockerbie trial.200
Dr. Köechler countered Mr. Corell’s statement with his own remarks that his
mission as an observer would have been “meaningless” if he were nominated only to
observe the trial and kept his observations and evaluation of the trial to himself.201 He
also stated that “the only meaningful interpretation of ‘international observer’ . . . must be
to observe the proceedings of the court in regard to basic aspects of fairness and due
process, and to share the observations, when appropriate, with the United Nations
Organization and the international public.” 202 It is undisputable that Dr. Köechler’s
report undermined the Lockerbie trial in the eyes of many in the world and the United
Nations should have evaluated whether Dr. Köechler was well-versed in Scottish law and
his role should have been clearly defined in advance.
As the IST Statute requires and the international community demands, there is a
role for FTOs in the IST. An FTO plays an important “watchdog” role as his or her role
is to make sure that trials are conducted fairly. This sends a message to the IST that the
world is watching and also shows the world that the IST is policing itself by utilizing
FTOs. The use of FTOs serve as a safeguard to charges of unfairness, bias, and victor’s
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justice claims.203 Employing unbiased FTOs will help to ease doubts that defendants
before the IST will be given fair trials. However, the IST should be careful to vet
potential FTOs and as the IST Statute requires “impartiality,” ideally, the IST should look
to unbiased third parties sent by NGOs.
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K.

Granting Defendants Provisional Release Pending Trial
The issue of provisional release pending trial has been explored in depth by the

ICTY. Initially, the ICTY was reluctant to grant defendants provisional release pending
trial. The original version of the rule governing provisional release, ICTY RPE Rule
65(B), placed a heavy burden on defendants by requiring them to prove that they would
not flee, pose no danger to others, and that there were “exceptional circumstances” which
would justify granting provisional release.204 The ICTY amended this rule in 1999 by
removing the “exceptional circumstances” requirement.205 Prior to this amendment, only
four defendants were granted provisional release.206 The rule was changed followed the
death of two detainees who were in custody awaiting trial.207 According to one of the
judges of the ICTY, the ICTY was “concerned about the ‘depressive effects’ of
prolonged pretrial detention.”208 Today, Rule 65(B) reads:
Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only after
giving the host country and the State to which the accused
seeks to be released the opportunity to be heard and only if
it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if
released, will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or
other person.209
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The more relaxed rule on provisional release seems to be in step with international human
rights law, which holds that “it shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial
shall be detained in custody.”210
The Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Halilovic granted defendant pre-trial
provisional release. In granting defendant’s request for provisional release, the ICTY
considered the following: that Halilovic’s trial would not start immediately; he would be
able to emotionally support his ailing son; the prosecution did not object to the request;
the Government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided guarantees that it
would be responsible for the custody of defendant; and that he voluntarily surrendered to
the custody of the ICTY. 211

The Trial Chamber granted defendant’s request for

provisional release on very specific terms and conditions. The terms and conditions
included: defendant must remain in the territory of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina; defendant must report every Monday to the local police; and defendant
must not discuss the details of the case with anyone except his lawyer.
Factors that have contributed to denials of grants of provisional release by the
ICTY have included: the failure by defendants to prove that they will appear for trial;212
lack of assurances by host countries;213 defendants at large and evading arrest by the
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ICTY;214 and serious disregard for the ICTY.215 In May 2004, Miroslav Radic requested
provisional release for five days to attend a memorial commemorating the anniversary of
his father’s death. The Trial Chamber denied his request finding that Radic’s reason
“does not in itself justify the provisional release of Radic.”216
Like the ICTY, the IST may want to grant provisional release to defendants who
can prove that they will not flee and pose no danger to others. Additionally, in light of
speedy trial concerns, if trials are long delayed, fairness may dictate provisional release.
As the defendants appearing before the IST will be citizens or residents of Iraq, the Iraqi
government must be able to give assurances that the defendants will return to appear
before the IST and that the safety of Iraqis and the defendants is assured. The IST may
find the use of technology in the form of “tracking devices” on defendants on provisional
release to ensure that they remain in a designated area and do not flee Iraq. Given the
current security situation, the IST should carefully examine whether granting provisional
release to defendants at this time, or in the near future, is appropriate.
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L.

Plea Bargaining
In addition to relaxing its rule on provisional release, the ICTY has also become

more receptive to plea bargaining. The Statute of the ICTY did not originally provide for
plea bargaining and the ICTY judges initially determined that plea bargaining was
incompatible with the objectives of international war crimes tribunals.217 However, as its
trials have dragged on, the ICTY has come to incorporate plea bargaining as a procedural
necessity in light of its heavy caseload and “complex body of governing law.”218 In
Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, the Appeals Chamber commented that plea bargains serve an
important purpose which take into account the ICTY’s complex and lengthy proceedings
and “stringent” budget concerns.219 Acceptance of plea bargaining also contributes to
legitimizing the ICTY which has been charged with being impartial by some ethnic
groups. 220 A leading commentator on plea bargaining at the ICTY, Nancy Amoury
Combs, in her analysis of Biljana Plavsic’s guilty plea, states:
Admissions of guilt from high-level defendants confer . . .
not only practical benefits, but reputational ones. . . . [and]
[a]n admission of guilt proffered by a defendant with such
sterling nationalist credentials as the Serbian Iron Lady
[Biljana Plavsic] not only provides strong evidence to
counteract the self-serving histories that still hold sway
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among Serbs, but also serves to legitimize the institution
that brought the criminal charges in the first place.221
The ICTY’s acceptance of plea bargaining is a positive development overall.222
However, Nancy Amoury Combs cautions, “[I]nstitutions like the ICTY can impair the
very reconciliation they seek to advance if the rewards that they hand out in appreciation
for reconciliation become themselves an additional source of bitterness.”223 Some Serbs
have considered plea bargains “humiliating” and displayed “bitterness” at the ICTY’s
embrace of plea bargaining.224 Others say that plea bargain procedures should be “more
transparent and offer a precise explanation of what is being pled to.” 225 The vicepresident of the Bosnian Serb group told Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, a former ICTY judge,
that Ms. Plavsic’s plea would not lead to the truth coming out.226 He states, “This is not
truth that will lead to peace and reconciliation.”227 However, Ms. McDonald was told by
a group of former Bosnian inmates that they understood the need for plea agreements in
light of the lengthy hearings and valuable information provided to the Prosecutor as a
result of the agreements.228 The President of the ICTY stated the ICTY’s view on the
value of plea agreements:
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[W]ith properly detailed acknowledgement by defendants
of their participation in the crimes for which they
acknowledge guilt and genuine expressions of remorse,
plea agreements can play a constructive role. In some
cases, a forthright and specific acknowledgement of guilt
may offer victims as much, or even more, consolation than
would a conviction following repeated protestations of
innocence.229
Ms. McDonald has recommended certain conditions to be present when
considering plea bargains. They are as follows:230
1) The complete indictment should be read aloud and a
waiver of the reading should not be allowed;
2) The Prosecutor should be required to give the fullest
disclosure of the facts that support the indictment;
3) The full plea agreement should be immediately released
to the public and if necessary, translated;
4) The Prosecutor should be required to present testimony
from the victims, similar to victim impact statements in
the U.S.; and
5) The sentence should reflect the seriousness of the
crimes and the judges should avoid any appearance that
they are bound by such plea agreements.
Overall, plea bargaining is a positive trend observed in the ICTY. As trials
become lengthy and expensive, guilty pleas “help expedite the docket” and lessen the
amount of time the accused spend in detention pre-trial. 231 If the guilty pleas are
accompanied by genuine expressions of remorse and guilt, they can help create a record
of the truth which may lead to reconciliation.232 Another benefit of plea bargaining is
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that it allows victims and witnesses to avoid testifying in trials and saves time and
resources.233
The IST can avoid the need for plea bargaining if it creates a prosecutorial
strategy, as mentioned above in Section E, that will limit the number of perpetrators to be
prosecuted.234 If the IST finds that plea bargains are a necessity, it should be careful to
ensure transparency in the procedure of plea bargaining and be cognizant of the effect
plea bargains may have on the victims.

It is important to note that bargaining of

sentences is “far less controversial than charge bargaining.”235 One commentator has
argued that plea bargains should create a historical record of the events that transpired,
“not only make findings of guilt or innocence,” and should also allow “victims and
witnesses to confront the perpetrators.” 236 Should the IST embrace plea bargains, it
should proceed very carefully and be aware of the impact plea bargains have on victims.
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M.

Judicial Notice
As the IST has yet to draft its rules of procedure and evidence, it is unclear what

role, if any, judicial notice will have in IST proceedings. The Special Tribunal Statute
states that the President of the Tribunal “shall be guided by the Iraqi Criminal Procedure
Law.”237 While judicial notice is not addressed in the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law,238
taking into account the numerous pieces of evidence that will likely be introduced into
evidence and time constraints on the IST, it is important for the President of the Tribunal
to look to the examples of other ad hoc tribunals and their treatment of judicial notice
when drafting the IST rules of procedure and evidence.
Judicial notice is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as “[a] court’s acceptance,
for purposes of convenience and without requiring a party’s proof, of a well-known and
indisputable fact.”239 For example, a court may take judicial notice of the indisputable
fact that “water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.”240 Judicial notice is taken by judges to
“promote expedience in trial proceedings and to prevent flagrant error.”241 This timesaving device is commonly used in common and civil law legal systems.242 Judicially
noticed facts are traditionally divided into two categories: adjudicative and legislative.
An adjudicative fact is a fact that is “controlling or operative . . . rather than a background
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fact.”243 Adjudicative facts “concern the immediate parties in a case: ‘who did what,
where, when, how and with what motive or intent.”244 Adjudicative facts may also be
facts that are generally known or easily verified such as calendar dates.245 A legislative
fact is a fact that “explains a particular law’s rationality and that helps a court . . .
determine the law’s content and application.”246 Legislative facts help to “determine the
content of law and policy and to exercise judgment or discretion in determining what
course of action to take” and “generally transcend the interests of the immediate
parties.”247
Judicial notice has also been adopted by the ICTY and the ICTR in their rules of
procedure and evidence. The ICTY and the ICTR have taken a “hybrid civil/common
law approach toward admission of evidence.”248 ICTY RPE Rule 94 and ICTR Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (“ICTR RPE”) state, “A Trial Chamber shall not require proof of
facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof.249 In addition, “At the
request of a party or proprio motu, a Trial Chamber, after hearing the parties may decide
to take judicial notice of adjudicated facts or documentary evidence from other
proceedings of the Tribunal relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings.”250 By
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allowing judicial notice of adjudicated facts or evidence from prior proceedings, the
ICTY and ICTR in effect are allowing affidavits to “‘prove a fact in dispute’ where the
affidavit was ‘in corroboration of’ a live witness’s testimony.”251 However, Prosecutorial
attempts to introduce affidavits pursuant to Rule 94 have been “repelled.”252 The ICTY
RPE and ICTR RPE do not distinguish between “adjudicative” or “legislative” facts but
only require that such facts be “common knowledge.”
In the ICTY, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Hadzihasanovic and Kubura
stated that “by taking judicial notice of an adjudicated fact from another case, the Trial
Chamber proceeds from the assumption that the fact is accurate, that is [sic] does not
need to be re-established at trial but that, insofar as it is an assumption, it may be
challenged at trial.” 253 In granting the defence request for judicial notice, the Trial
Chamber in Hadzihasanovic cited to the Trial Chamber’s conclusion in the Krajisnik case
that for a fact to be admitted pursuant to Rule 94(B) of the ICTY RPE, the fact must have
been “truly adjudicated in previous judgments” and fulfill the following factors:254
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

it is distinct, concrete and identifiable;
it is restricted to factual findings and does not
include legal characterizations;
it was contested at trial and forms part of a
judgment which has either not been appealed or has
been finally settled on appeal; or
it was contested at trial and now forms part of a
judgment which is under appeal, but falls within
issues which are not in dispute on appeal;
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(v)

it does not have a bearing on the criminal
responsibility of the Accused;
(vi)
it is not subject of (reasonable) dispute between the
Parties in the present case;
(vii) it is not based on plea agreements in previous cases;
and
(viii) it does not negatively affect on the right of the
Accused to a fair trial.
It is proposed that the IST look to examples of judicial notice taken in the ICTY
and the ICTR. The IST should focus on being transparent in its application of judicial
notice so that all parties are confident that the use of it is appropriate.255 Also, the IST
should notify the opposing party that it is taking judicial notice so that the opposing party
is given the opportunity to dispute the taking of it. 256 In addition, the IST should
distinguish between adjudicative and legislative facts.

For example, “[a] previous

decision taking judicial notice of a matter as a legislative fact should generally not be
authority for notice of the same matter as an adjudicative fact.”257 Judicial notice will
help to expedite IST proceedings especially in light of the fact that many of the accused
are being charged with the same crimes. For judicial notice to be an effective procedural
tool, the IST should ensure that its use of judicial notice is executed fairly and must
discourage abuse of the doctrine.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
The IST has much to learn from the experiences of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL.

While it is unlikely that the experiences of the ICTY, ICTR, or SCSL will be directly
transferable to the IST as the IST was created under circumstances which set it apart from
these three courts, many of the issues encountered by these courts will most likely be
raised during trials at the IST. These lessons learned can be valuable and relevant as the
IST’s mandate is similar to the three courts – to prosecute those responsible for war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.
The tu quoque defense in international tribunals goes back to Nuremberg and was
raised in the ICTY. Saddam Hussein has indicated that he may argue a tu quoque
defense. The right to self representation will likely be raised in the IST and there is an
abundance of analysis in the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL on whether this right is absolute.
The devices adopted for judicial efficiency such as plea bargains adopted by these courts
can be further explored by the IST. Also, the IST can learn from the experiences of the
ICTY, ICTRY, and the SCSL, in their failures and successes in gaining credibility and
reaching out to the people for whom they are conducting trials.

Procedural and

evidentiary matters such as the requirement of live witness testimony, protection of
witnesses, and the rule of judicial notice are also issues that the IST will likely face as
trials begin at the IST.
Although the IST Statutes specifies that the IST rules of procedure and evidence
“shall be guided by the Iraqi Criminal Procedure Law,”258 there are issues that the IST
will likely encounter which are similar to the three international criminal tribunals that
258
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will warrant its examination of the relevant decisions of these courts. Also, the IST
Statute specifically permits the IST Trial Chambers and Appeals Chamber to consider
“relevant decisions of international courts or tribunals as persuasive authority for their
decisions” in interpreting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.259 It is
important that the IST examines the actions of the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL, so that it can
learn from their experiences which will contribute to the IST’s efficiency, administration
of justice, and reconciliatory role.
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